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ABSTRACT
The Recent Economic Role of Bank-Firm Relationships in Japan
by Tobias Miarka
Our analysis highlights central aspects of the role of Japanese bank-firm relationships in
times of deregulation. Comparing our results with earlier findings, it becomes evident
that financial deregulation has triggered dramatic changes concerning the position of
banks in the financial market and their relationships with large manufacturing firms.
Since deregulation has opened up domestic as well as foreign capital markets, easy
access to capital is not limited to bank-affiliated firms. While in earlier years firms with
close banking ties may have been more profitable or used their advantages to enhance
their growth or the compensation of employees, now whether such a relationship
benefits a firm or acts as an obstacle depends largely upon the nature of that
relationship. Hence, there are two general points made in this paper. First, in order to
assess the economic role of bank affiliations, it is of eminent importance to differentiate
between the various ways of establishing and maintaining bank-firm relationships.
Second, the rapid development of the Japanese financial market over the last two
decades has reduced the monopoly power of banks in a wide range of areas, which has
caused dramatic changes concerning the benefits and costs of bank-firm relationships.
ZUSAMMENSETZUNG
Die derzeitige Rolle der Bank-Firmen-Beziehungen in Japan
Im Mittelpunkt der vorliegenden Analyse steht die Rolle japanischer Bank-Firmen-
Beziehungen im Zuge der Deregulierung des japanischen Finanzmarktes. Vergleicht
man unsere Ergebnisse mit früheren Untersuchungen japanischer Bank-Firmen-Bezie-
hungen, werden zwei Punkte unmittelbar deutlich. Zum einen löst die Deregulierung
des japanischen Finanzmarktes außergewöhnlich starke Änderungen hinsichtlich der
Position der Banken im nationalen wie auch internationalen Finanzmarkt aus. Zum
anderen sind Art und Ausmaß der Beziehungen zwischen Banken und Firmen funda-
mentalen Änderungen ausgesetzt. Seit durch die Deregulierung der japanische wie auch
internationale Finanzmarkt geöffnet wurde, ist der einfache Zugang zu Kapital in Japan
nicht mehr beschränkt auf den Kreis von Firmen mit exzellenten Bankbeziehungen. Vor
der Deregulierung waren Firmen mit engen Bankbeziehungen meist profitabler und
konnten ihre Bankbeziehungen nutzen, um ihr Wachstum zu steigern. Eine enge Bank-
Firmen-Beziehung galt als ein zentraler Wettbewerbsvorteil. Heute zeichnet sich ein
differenzierteres Bild. Es ist mehr und mehr abhängig von der jeweiligen Art und dem
Ausmaß der Bankbeziehungen, ob diese Beziehungen einen positiven Einfluß auf die
Entwicklung der Firma haben, oder ob Bankbeziehungen die Firma in ihrer Entwick-
lung einschränken. Die Untersuchung unterstreicht dabei zwei grundsätzliche Erkennt-
nisse. Erstens ist es notwendig, bei der Analyse der ökonomischen Rolle von Bank-
Firmen-Beziehungen zwischen den vielfältigen Arten möglicher Bankbeziehungen zu
differenzieren. Diese Differenzierung wird in der vorliegenden Arbeit konsequent ver-
folgt. Zweitens ist festzustellen, daß die rasche Entwicklung des japanischen Finanz-
marktes während der letzten zwei Jahrzehnte die Monopolstellung der Banken in vielen
Bereichen vermindert hat. Mit Hilfe einer Vielzahl von Analysen wird gezeigt, daß
diese Entwicklung fundamentale Änderungen bezüglich des Nutzens und der Kosten
von Bank-Firmen-Beziehungen ausgelöst hat.
1. Introduction
The following analysis is motivated by theories of financial intermediation that
accentuate the information advantages of financial intermediaries, through which they
can (partially) overcome frictions such as information asymmetries and agency
problems of managerial behavior (e.g. Leland and Pyle 1977; Campbell and Kracaw
1980; Diamond 1984, 1991; Ramakrishnan and Thakor 1984; Fama 1985; Boyd and
Prescott 1986; Haubrich 1989; Rajan 1992). Especially in financial systems like those
of Japan or Germany, banks may acquire information through their relationships with
firms by continuously monitoring the performance of clients under credit arrangements,
as well as through the provision of other services such as deposit accounts, cash
management services, bankers acceptances, credit card processing, pension fund
management, factoring, or sales financing. Banks may enjoy economies of scale as well
as comparative advantages in the production of information about borrowers. Being a
debt holder as well as a shareholder that in many cases maintains personnel ties with a
client firm, bank influence is not limited to indirect influence from information acquired
for credit decisions. The banks position enables them to influence the corporate
behavior of a client firm directly, for example, by using their voting rights as a major
shareholder or by implementing decisions via their representative(s) on the board of the
firm.
Due to the banks unique position, contracting in the bank loan market seems to
differ substantially from contracting in other debt markets that offer arms-length
finance. In the last decade, empirical literature drawing from US as well as European1
data has further examined the exceptional features of intermediaries in general, and
bank-firm relationships in particular (e.g. James 1987; Lummer and McConnell 1989;
James and Wier 1990; Wansley, Elayan, and Collins 1992; Shockley and Thakor 1993;
Kwan 1994; Petersen and Rajan 1994, 1995; Berger and Udell 1995, Billett, Flannery
and Garfinkel 1995; Elston and Albach 1995; Albach 1998, 1999b; Harhoff and Körting
1998a, 1998b; Berglöf and Sjögren 1998; Degryse and Ongena 1999; Yang 2000).
Following the same strain of literature but examining Japanese competitiveness,
Nakatani (1984); Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a, 1990b, 1991); Teranishi
                                                
1 German and Scandinavian data in particular.
2(1993); Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994); as well as Hoshi, Kashyap, and Loveman
(1994), among others, claim that close relationships between firms and financial
institutions are important to the international competitiveness of large Japanese firms.
Regardless of whether Japanese, U.S. or European data is examined, most of these
studies indicate, among other things, the advantages of relationships between banks and
firms, especially when it comes to borrowing. In particular, the majority of the analyses
agree that the primary benefit to a firm that builds close ties with one or more banks is
an increase in the availability of financing2.
However, some of the analyses also reveal that these advantages are not without
costs. Highlighting drawbacks of German bank-firm relationships, Albach (1998)
suggests that it might be possible to overcome the lack of competition within the
German financial system by strengthening the German capital market and by reducing
the banks influence on the supervisory boards of client firms.
Theory and empirical evidence seem to suggest that whether the advantages of
bank-firm relationships outweigh the costs depends heavily on the economys state of
development, as well as the legal and institutional structure of its financial markets.
Gerschenkron (1962) argues that initial stages of economic development can be better
promoted by banking systems and controlled capital markets, whereas subsequent
economic progress may benefit from more liberal securities markets. In an early
analysis of Japanese growth between 1868-1940, Rosovsky (1961) applies
Gerschenkrons framework to show the merits of developing close ties between
manufacturing firms and financial institutions in order to overcome the relative
backwardness of Japans economy at that time. Only recently, an increasing number of
scholars have started to argue that Japan held on to a highly regulated banking system
and a controlled capital market for too long after it had already become a fully-
developed economy.
Facing a most dramatic banking crisis and a troubled economy, the overwhelming
majority of scholars as well as politicians seem to agree by now that, for the stage of
development the Japanese economy has reached, the distortionary price for the
provision of capital becomes a more troublesome source of inefficiency than during the
                                                
2 It should be noted, however, that there are a few theorists like Blackwell and Santomero (1982), who
do not agree that stronger bank-firm relations will always increase the firms access to capital.
3early decades of high growth. Recent studies like that of Weinstein and Yafeh (1998)
corroborate this view. They offer empirical evidence that in the absence of contestable
capital markets, large banks with close ties to industry siphon profits and restrict
investment, and thus may inhibit rather than encourage growth (Weinstein and Yafeh
1998: 666). Japanese authorities have subsequently recognized the need to adjust the
financial system in order to secure continued economic progress. Beyond doubt, there
has been a considerable time gap between recognizing the need for change and
implementing necessary adjustments. Nevertheless, by now it is considered common
knowledge that opening up arms-length markets may make the most economic sense.
The following analysis is similar to the empirical studies cited above, to the extent
that we examine both advantages and costs of bank-firm relationships. Our approach,
however, differs from those of previous studies in that we emphasize differentiation
between various ways of establishing and maintaining bank-firm relationships. Our
unique data set (see Albach et al. 1997 for an in-depth description of the data set) allows
us a closer look at whether corporate behavior can be influenced by the degree as well
as nature of bank affiliations. It is possible to analyze ways in which close and
continued interactions between banks and firms may provide firms with a competitive
edge, and which aspects inhibit rather than encourage firm development. For this
purpose, we do not want to restrict a priori the various possible interpretations. Hence,
we refrain from using statistical selection processes that might eliminate specifications
of bank-firm relationships from our regression models.
Most of the empirical analyses of Japanese bank-firm relationships have used data
that include periods during which an underdeveloped Japanese capital market endowed
financial institutions, especially banks, with a wide range of monopoly power. Hence,
the impact of recent legal as well as institutional changes in Japans financial markets
could not, at least to its full extent, be captured by previous studies. Using a data set that
covers the period between 1985-1998, an additional contribution of this study to the
existing literature is that it sheds more light on how the dramatic process of deregulation
and liberalization since the 1980s may have changed the economic role of Japanese
bank-firm relationships.
The following analysis of the recent economic role of bank-firm relationships
comprises a variety of input as well as output factors that concern the development of
4the firm. The rest of the analysis proceeds as follows: in chapter 1.2, we analyze
whether bank affiliations increase the profitability of firms or are rather an obstacle to
promoting profit. Chapter 1.3 observes the impact of bank-firm relationships on growth
rates. We test whether bank affiliations enhance firm growth or are more likely to slow
down further growth, especially of large, mature manufacturing firms. In chapter 1.4 we
will look for empirical evidence that may support the view that bank-firm relationships
are used to increase a firms personnel welfare. The analysis proceeds with chapter 1.5
by analyzing whether bank-firm relationships may reduce firm risk. Chapter 1.6
discusses the impact of bank affiliations on the cost and stability of interest rates on
borrowings.  We first analyze whether bank affiliations may change the cost of bank
loans.  In a second step, we observe whether banks provide an insurance function by
reducing interest rate fluctuations for client firms or rather offer incentives by
monitoring and adjusting interest rates. The study closes with some concluding remarks
in 1.7.
2. Profitability and Bank-Firm Relationship
2.1 Introduction
Set against firms without bank relationships, one of the often-cited competitive
advantages of bank-affiliated Japanese firms is their easy access to capital (Aoki,
Patrick, and Sheard 1994). Analyzing the impact of bank relationships on keiretsu3
affiliated firms, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991: 49) find that the closer a firm
moves to the group banks, the more easily a firm can attract funds to finance investment
projects, although they find no significant differences in investment levels. Note that
analyzing U.S. data on small firms, Petersen and Rajan (1994) obtain similar results. In
their study, they demonstrate that close relationships with a bank increase the
availability of capital. However, bank relationships do not seem to reduce its costs.
The importance of bank-firm relationships in Japan becomes immediately clear
when we reconsider the financial environment of corporate Japan until the 1980s.
During most of the post-war period, firms could raise only limited amounts of capital
                                                
3 In the following, a keiretsu is perceived as a kinyû keiretsu i.e. a group of firms organized around a
bank. Its formation is mainly based on financial aspects (provision of loans, mutual shareholdings,
etc.) and opportunities to exchange information, rather than the transaction of goods.
5through commercial floatation of debt or equity. Thus, firms mainly relied on internal
and bank finance. In addition, Japanese capital markets were traditionally segmented,
with the result that some firms had to cope with limited supply of capital while others
enjoyed easy access to (bank) finance. Considering this environment, simple economic
theory leads us to expect the bank-affiliated firms to outperform their unaffiliated,
capital-rationed competitors.
However, as liberalization and with it the variety of financial sources other than
bank debt have increasingly gained momentum since the early 1980s, the environment
of corporate Japan concerning the supply of capital certainly has been changing. With
financial liberalization facilitating access to a variety of outside financial sources,
Miarka (1999) notes an increasing use of the capital market especially by highly valued
firms, whether they are affiliated with banks or not. Being able to convince the capital
market that it chooses the investment project with a high probability of success even
without being forced by monitoring banks to act diligently, a firm does not necessarily
need a bank relationship to secure easy access to outside capital. Since bank-affiliated
firms have to compete increasingly with firms which can attract other sources of finance
that are often cheaper than bank debt, we expect that the competitive advantage once
claimed only by bank-affiliated firms now has to be shared with an increasing number
of other firms. Firms that are highly valued by the capital market should be motivated to
work profitably. Therefore a high market value should be positively correlated with
profitability.
Even for the period between 1971-1982, however, when sources of outside finance
other than bank finance were much more limited than in recent years, Nakatanis (1984)
sample shows that despite easy access to capital, firms affiliated with a corporate
financial group did not demonstrate higher rates of profit. He argues that the motivation
for forming and maintaining a kinyû keiretsu must be found elsewhere than in profit
maximization behavior. Using pooled data comprising the years 1977-1986, the OLS
regression results of Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) confirm Nakatanis original findings
for the case of main bank clients.
To summarize so far, we can state that bank-firm relationships have both
advantages and disadvantages. The overall impact depends upon the prevailing type of
bank-firm relationship and to what degree alternative sources of finance are available.
6In the following, we analyze whether the popular hypothesis that bank-affiliated firms
outperform their unaffiliated peers is still valid for the boom-bust cycle. Note that we do
not limit our analysis to the impact of main bank affiliation or kinyû keiretsu affiliation.
Rather, we test whether the hypothesis holds true for a variety of bank-firm
relationships such as relationships based on bank-dispatched directors (DISPATCH),
bank-held shares (SHARE), a kinyû keiretsu (KEILO) affiliation and main bank
relationships (MAIN) (see appendix for definition of variables).
2.2 Empirical Analysis 
In order to reflect the performance of relevant business activities for the period in
question and to ensure that the measure is not subject to various artificial modifications
which might not reveal the actual performance of the firms activities, we follow
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), by measuring profitability as the rate of ordinary income
over sales. In contrast to operating profits, this measure also includes receipts of interest
and dividends as well as interest paid to financial institutions. It would be misleading to
use only operating profits, since for many firms the receipts of interest contributed
strongly4 to the firms overall profitability5, especially during the bubble period.
The results of the fixed effects regressions, which are based on our panel data set
that comprises the period between 1985-1998 are summarized in table 1-1. Controlling
for further factors that may affect accounting measures of profitability like growth rates,
leverage, etc. (see Weinstein and Yafeh 1995, 1998; Fisher 1987), table 1-1 underlines
that depending on the nature of bank affiliation, bank-firm relationships have, if at all, a
mixed effect on profitability.
                                                
4 Schaede (1990) shows that using zaiteku (high-tech financial management), in the second half of the
1980s many manufacturing firms generated more than 50 per cent of their yearly profits from
financial investment.
5 Running regressions with other measures of profits, e.g. business profits over total assets (see
Nakatani 1984), produces similar results. However, in order to compare our results with those of
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), we focused on interpreting the regression using ordinary income over
sales.
7Table 2-1: Profitability, 1985-1998
Dependent variable: ordinary income over sales
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1) (2) (3)
Relationship KEILO 0.00101*** 0.00099*** 0.00096***
Variables (3.559) (3.548) (3.456)
DISPATCH -0.00031 -0.00037* -0.00036*
(-1.386) (-1.687) (-1.660)
SHARE -0.00028 -0.00039* -0.00038*
(1.255) (1.792) (1.710)
MB -0.00277 -0.00170 -0.00253
(-0.861) (-0.540) (-0.805)
Sig. relation 0.000 0.000 0.000
ship variables
Control Bank debt/ -0.1607*** -0.01202*** -0.01338***
Variables total debt (-4.304) (-3.292) (-3.642)
MV 0.00452*** 0.00566*** 0.00481***
(6.624) (9.494) (7.194)
Sales growth 0.04028*** 0.04581*** 0.04334***
(5.837) (6.807) (6.403)
Debt/sales -0.02598*** -0.01484***
(-4.959) (-2.770)
Log (sales) 0.05208*** 0.04612*** 0.04290***
(10.215) (9.166) (8.329)
GDP 0.00648*** 0.00553*** 0.00557***
(11.484) (9.752) (9.845)
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
8Table 2-2: Profitability, 1985-1998 (Continued)
Dependent variable: ordinary income over sales
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1) (2) (3)
Control Firm risk -0.45118*** -0.40603***
Variables (-8.330) (-7.197)
Size 0.00451* 0.00303 0.00438*
(1.891) (1.322) (1.874)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Statistics N of
observations
1288 1288 1288
N of groups 92 92 92
Obs. per group 14 14 14
Sign. F 0.000 0.000 0.000
2R 0.4758 0.4947 0.4980
DW6 1.8450 1.8546 1.8583
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
To be more precise, the coefficient of the variable KEILO is positive and
significant at the one per cent level. Similar to the analysis of Weinstein and Yafeh
(1998), but unlike Nakatani (1984), the regression specifications in columns (2) and (3)
include a measure of firm risk. We use the variance of the return on sales over five years
                                                
6 For Durbin-Watson, here as well as for the analyses below, we followed Bhargava, Franzini, and
Narendranathan (1982), who generalize Durbin-Watson type statistics to test the OLS residuals from the
fixed effects model for serial independence.
9(Geisen 1979)7. Hence, we can conclude that profitability differences between firms
with a bank affiliation through kinyû keiretsu loan dependency and other firms cannot
be due solely to differences in risk. Column (2) underlines that the results remain stable
even when leverage is excluded from the regression (because it may be correlated with
KEILO). Thus, other things being equal, a bank relationship that allows a strong usage
of kinyû keiretsu loans appears to increase profitability.
 However, the variables of all other measures of bank-firm relationships suggest a
negative impact on profitability. The coefficients of the two variables DISPATCH and
SHARE are both negative and in the regression specifications which include the
measure for firm risk, they are both significant at the ten per cent level. This indicates
that including a measure of risk in our specifications improves the explanatory power of
our regression to describe the impact of bank-firm relationships on profitability.
The coefficient of the main bank dummy also shows a negative sign throughout all
specifications. Even though the result is not significant at any acceptable level8, it does
to some extent corroborate the findings of Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), that a main
bank affiliation does not seem to improve profitability.
Turning to the control variables, we find that profitability is a decreasing function
of the bank debt to total debt ratio. The coefficient of the variable is negative and
significant at the one per cent level. It remains unchanged throughout the regression
specifications, indicating that the relatively low profitability of firms which use banks as
an important source of capital remains unchanged even when firm risk is added to the
regression or a measure for leverage is excluded. The results underscore that the
difference between firms for which banks are an important source of capital and firms
that use mostly alternative sources cannot be due exclusively to different degrees of
firm risk.
                                                
7 Following Geisen (1979: 395), we define firm risk as the variance of the return on sales over five
years at a time, so that
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8 Accounting for the number of firms under investigation, the level of significance should be ≤ 10 per
cent (Kennedy 1985: 62; Leamer 1978: 88 and 104).
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Comparing the coefficient of the bank debt to total debt ratio with the coefficient of
the variable KEILO, the result emphasizes that it is most important to differentiate
between different sources of bank debt. While loans from financial institutions of the
same keiretsu, which are most likely coordinated by the groups main bank, seem to
help increase profitability, bank loans in general seem to do the opposite. Our
interpretation of this finding is that when firms are allowed by their keiretsu banks to
actually use keiretsu loans, the rents from this preferential access to capital do accrue
largely to these firms. In other words, suppose the closeness to the group of banks of the
same keiretsu can be described by the degree of access to keiretsu bank loans; it seems
that once keiretsu affiliated firms have managed to establish a close relationship, they
can actually enhance profitability. Hence, we cannot support the general statement made
by Nakatani (1984) that firms affiliated with bank-centered corporate groups do not
have higher rates of profit. Note, however, that in recent years not all keiretsu affiliated
firms have had easy access to keiretsu loans. Taking this development into account, it
rather seems to depend on whether or not firms affiliated with bank-centered groups
manage to attract loans originating from banks of their group. Thus, the results do not
suggest that a keiretsu affiliation itself is enough to enhance profitability.
Furthermore, the positive sign of the coefficient for firm size is quite surprising
since it is widely believed that the rate of profits declines as firm size increases.
Nevertheless, this finding is similar to the results of Nakatani (1984). Finally, as
expected, profitability is positively correlated with GDP growth as well as with the ratio
of market value to total liabilities.
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2.3 Conclusion
To summarize, with regard to the significance of the vast majority of variables
comprising different bank-firm relationships as well as accounting for the joint
significance of these variables, we can observe that bank-firm relationships have an
impact on the profitability of firms. However, depending on the nature of the
relationship, the impact seems to differ in intensity as well as direction. While bank
affiliations that lead to easy access to keiretsu loans enhance profitability, all other types
of bank-firm relationships seem to have a negative impact on a firms profit. Hence it
seems most important to differentiate between different bank-firm relationships in order
to ascertain their advantages and disadvantages.
3.1 Growth Rates
3.1.1 Introduction
According to numerous analyses on corporate behavior, firms with close bank
affiliations use their easy access to capital to advance their growth record rather than
being primarily concerned about profitability, even in the long term (e.g. Hoshi,
Kashyap and Scharfstein 1991; Beason and James 1999). Hence, one might assume that
for bank-affiliated firms, size and therefore growth rather than profitability are most
important. Indeed, in the case of the German bank-centered financial market system,
Gerschenkron (1962) argues that large German banks have been able to continuously
accelerate growth of their large corporate customers, while profitability was of
secondary concern. Without doubt, the bank-centered financial system was of central
importance for Japan in helping its economy develop and flourish from Meiji
Restoration until the beginning of the Second World War (Rosovsky 1961; Yabushita
and Inoue 1993), as well as during the rapid growth period between the mid-1950s to
the mid-1970s (e.g. Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard 1994). These were the periods when
firms were growing rapidly and were hungry for investment funds, without being much
concerned about profitability. Especially during the post-war era of high growth, where
financial markets were heavily regulated in favor of existing banks, strong bank-
affiliations were certainly the cornerstone of corporate financial strategy and virtually
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essential for corporate success (Aoki, Patrick and Sheard 1994). At the end of this
period, Japan advanced to become the worlds second largest market economy, with
European levels of per capita income.
Moreover, growth rather than profitability is often claimed to be of central interest
for the employees of a Japanese firm, including the top management. To further
understand this, note that under the Japanese seniority promotion system, faster growth
leads to an increase in the probability of opportunities for faster promotions, hence more
quickly raising salaries as well as status. Rapid growth furthermore strengthens the
financing of the firms pension scheme, since an employee of a fast growing firm will
have many employees in that firm younger than himself (Komiya 1990).
However, analyzing the role of keiretsu affiliations, Nakatani (1984) finds no
positive impact from kinyû keiretsu membership on the growth of firms. Furthermore,
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) show that annual growth rates of main bank clients are not
much different from those of their peers. Considering the liberalization of the financial
market, which gradually exposes Japan to a highly competitive environment where large
firms especially have to compete for funds on an international level, it is hard to
imagine that these firms can afford to be primarily interested in growth rather than
safeguarding investors interests.
3.1.2 Empirical Analysis
In previous work (Miarka 1999, 2000) it has been argued that the ability of a bank
affiliation to positively influence a firms profitability depends largely on the nature of
that affiliation. In fact, only the variable for KEILO indicated that bank-firm
relationships seem to improve firm profitability. It is therefore worthwhile to examine
whether during times of liberalized financial markets, when the interests of investors are
increasingly stressed, the potential advantages of bank affiliations are still revealed in
faster growth rates rather than in profitability.
To measure the growth of firms, we used a wide range of criteria in initial
modeling attempts, including the growth of sales, total assets, equity, gross performance
and property compensation. In order to compare our results with those of Nakatani
(1984), and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), in the following we will analyze the
regression results when using the growth rate of sales (table 3-1). However, the
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estimates based on the other measures of growth mentioned above are all very similar.
The joined significance of the relationship variables does not provide any evidence
that bank-firm relationships have explanatory power for the firms growth rates. Being
negative and significant at the ten per cent level after including the measure for firm risk
(column 2), though small, the coefficient of the variable DISPATCH indicates that
growth rates of firms with bank dispatched directors are slightly lower than those of
other firms. All other results for variables representing bank-firm relationships do not
show significance at any acceptable level.
However, the coefficient of the bank debt to total debt ratio, being negative and
significant at the one per cent level after controlling for the (log) level of firm sales
lagged one period, underscores that annual growth rates of firms whose bank loans
account for a high portion of total indebtedness are in fact lower than those of their
peers during the sample period. It is furthermore interesting to note that, contrary to
expectations, the growth rate of sales is positively correlated with the firms size in
terms of assets, whereas the coefficient of the risk variable suggests that a high level of
firm risk leads to lower growth rates of sales.
Table 3-1: Growth rate of sales, 1985-1998
Dependent variable: Growth of sales compared to the previous year
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1) (2)
Relationship KEILO -0.00009 -0.00037
Variables  (-0.080)  (-0.330)
DISPATCH -0.00132 -0.00145*
 (-1.475)  (-1.649)
SHARE 0.00081 0.00046
 (0.904)  (0.524)
MB 0.00244 0.00111
 (0.191)  (0.088)
Sig. relationship variables  0.2218  0.2218
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3-1: Growth rate of sales, 1985-1998 (Continued)
Dependent variable: Growth of sales compared to the previous year
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1) (2)
Control Bank debt/total debt -0.04537*** -0.03766***
Variables  (-3.080)  (-2.597)
Log (lagged sales) -0.27265*** -0.30468***
(-15.664) (-17.185)
Firm risk -1.42526***
 (-6.761)
Size 0.03635*** 0.03895***
 (3.958)  (4.317)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Statistics Number of observations 1288 1288
Number of groups     92     92
Obs. per group     14    14
Sign. F 0.000 0.000
2R 0.4257 0.4472
DW 1.7943 1.8143
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
3.3 Conclusion
All in all, concerning the impact of bank-firm relationships on growth rates of
firms, our results are close in line with those of Nakatani (1984) and Weinstein and
Yafeh (1998). Claiming a close bank relationship when a firm is affiliated with a kinyû
keiretsu or a main bank respectively, they do not find annual growth rates of affiliated
firms to be larger than those of independent firms. Hence, we can conclude that at least
since the 1980s, the often-claimed advantage of a bank relationship is not manifest in
faster growth.
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In fact, our results tentatively suggest that, if it has any impact at all, an affiliation
with a bank may be an obstacle rather than a benefit to increasing annual growth rates.
This result may corroborate the findings of Houston and James (1996). Though they
focus on different aspects of bank-firm relationships, they find that since the early
1980s, firms that have maintained a long-term relationship with a single creditor were
likely to have weak opportunities of growth. The result can be furthermore interpreted
to suggest that bank-firm relationships are more common for mature firms with low
growth rates.
4. Compensation of Employees
4.1 Introduction
Nakatani (1984) argues that rather than maximization of profit or growth, an
appropriate motive for a keiretsu affiliation is the pursuit of employee interests.
Obviously, Nakatani does not subscribe to the argument of Komiya (1990) mentioned
above, that advancing growth rates support the interests of employees. Instead, he
claims that the advantages of having easy access to capital via a close kinyû keiretsu
affiliation benefit personnel welfare much more directly. Taking advantage of easy
capital access in order to enhance employee welfare rather than increase profitability or
growth would certainly be an indicator of the priority of employee interests over the
interests of other stakeholders, especially those of shareholders. Furthermore, it would
provide empirical evidence for the often-claimed intention of Japanese top management
to value employee interests above shareholder interests (Gerlach 1992; Komiya 1990).
It would also therefore be in line with the popular belief that the objective of Japanese
corporations contrasts sharply with Anglo-Saxon corporate attitudes. In order to draw a
more complete picture of the impact of bank-firm relationships on corporate behavior,
we therefore continue our analysis by examining each of the possible forms of bank
affiliations under consideration, and determining whether the relationship supports
employee interests in the sense of directly enhancing personnel compensation.
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4.2 Empirical Analysis
In our analysis of employee compensation, which focuses on the impact of bank
affiliations, the average compensation to employees is computed as the ratio of the
firms total labor cost (including salary, other compensations, contributions to fringe
benefits and social security) to the number of employees at the end of each accounting
period9. Table 4-1 presents estimation results of the determinants of employee
compensation.
Table 4-1: Average compensation to employee, 1985-1998
Dependent variable: ratio of the firms total labor cost to the number of employees
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1) (2) (3)
Relationship KEILO -0.00516 -0.00409 -0.00463
Variables  (-0.742)  (-0.592)  (-0.671)
DISPATCH -0.00891* -0.00894* -0.00901*
 (-1.638)  (-1.657)  (-1.669)
SHARE -0.00183 -0.00355 -0.00329
 (-0.335)  (-0.652)  (-0.603)
MB 0.18995** 0.17442** 0.17709**
 (2.410)  (2.227)  (2.262)
KEIRETSU -0.15310
 (-1.283)
Sig. relationship 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
variables
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
                                                
9 Note that concerning the data on employees for our analysis, the yûka shôken hôkokushô discloses
only data on core employees known as sha-in (company members), that is, permanent or long-term
employees who entered the firm (nyusha or shushoku) upon graduation from school, although a few
hired later could also be included. This group includes both blue-collar and white-collar workers. Part-
timers, temporary employees, shokutaku (non-regular staff members) and outside workers (those
hired and dispatched by a subcontracting company) are not included.
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Table 4-1: Average compensation to employee, 1985-1998 (Continued)
Dependent variable: ratio of the firms total labor cost to the number of employees
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1) (2) (3)
Control Bank debt/total debt -0.12362 -0.10039 -0.10745
Variables  (-1.347)  (-1.100)  (-1.179)
ordinary income/sales 1.98068*** 1.02737** 1.03005**
 (4.267)  (2.010)  (2.015)
capital/employees 0.00698*** 0.00724*** 0.00722***
 (5.142)  (5.368)  (5.349)
RME 1.20627** 1.18362** 1.16029**
 (2.140)  (2.114)  (2.073)
Log (employees) -0.43888*** -0.55683*** -0.56078***
 (-2.727)  (-3.432)  (-3.456)
Firm risk -6.02720*** -6.07564***
 (-4.258)  (-4.292)
Size -0.02679 -0.01008 -0.01057
 (-0.460)  (-0.174)  (-0.182)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Statistics Number of observations 1288 1288 1288
Number of groups     92     92     92
Obs. per group     14     14     14
Sign. F 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
2R within 0.6643 0.6699 0.6695
DW 1.9465 1.9548 1.9597
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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As expected, the average compensation to employees is positively correlated with
profit (income over sales), hence suggesting the existence of profit sharing between
employees and other stakeholders in Japanese firms (Nakatani 1984; Komiya 1990).
The bonus system, where the amount paid to employees varies according to the firms
success, is one example for the channels frequently used to allocate additional payments
so that employees participate directly in the firms profit (loss). Though not significant,
the coefficient of the bank debt to total debt ratio tentatively suggests that the more
dependent a firm is on rather costly bank loans as a source of outside finance, the
smaller is its ability to pay high compensations for employees. Explanatory variables
furthermore include measures like capital intensity that may affect accounting measures
of employee compensation. It is no surprise that with an increasing ratio of capital per
employee, employee compensation increases. Note that the coefficient of firm size in
terms of assets has a negative sign but shows no statistical significance at any
acceptable level, which suggests that for the firms included in our analysis, employee
compensation is not a function of firm size. It is furthermore interesting to note that
employee compensation is a decreasing function of firm risk.
Following Hadley (1970) and Nakatani (1984), we also include a ratio that reflects
the age structure as well as the male-female composition of employees (RME). This is
the ratio of male employees to total employees adjusted with respect to the age structure
of the work force of each firm10. As shown in table 4-1, the coefficient of RME is
positive and significant at the five per cent level. The positive correlation between the
average compensation to employees and the age-corrected ratio of the male-female
composition of employees shows that for the sample analyzed, the seniority wage
system and the fact that male employees earn more than their female colleagues is still
vivid. Thus, males counting among the core employees (sha-in) of large Japanese firms
seem to be still largely protected by the umbrella of the lifetime employment and the
seniority promotion system. In this respect, Nakatanis (1984) findings from his 1971-
1982 sample are corroborated by our 1985-1998 sample results.
                                                
10 The ratio of male employees to total employees adjusted with respect to the age structure of a firms
work force has been computed as follows:
RME = 
AGFFEAGMME
AGMME
×+×
×
with ME: number of male employees; AGM: average age of male employees; FE: number of female
employees; AGF: average age of female employees (see Hadley 1970).
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For the purpose of this analysis, however, the most important coefficients are those
of the bank-firm relationship variables. Testing for the joint significance of our bank-
firm relationship variables, we find that bank affiliations have an impact on the average
compensation of employees. Nevertheless, the impact is heterogeneous in intensity as
well as direction: The coefficient of the main bank dummy is positive and significant at
the five per cent level. However, although the statistical significance is not high for
most of the other relationship variables, the fact that they are all negative suggests that
bank-firm relationships other than a main bank affiliation do not raise the average
compensation of employees. Notice that the regression specification presented in
column (3) includes (unlike Nakatanis (1984) experiment) the measure of firm risk,
which has already been used above. Hence we can conclude that differences of
employee compensation between firms with bank relationships and other firms cannot
be due solely to differences in risk.
4.3 Conclusion
To summarize, only main bank affiliations have a positive impact on the
compensation of employees, while all other types of bank-firm relationships under
observation tend to have a negative influence. Our interpretation of this finding is that
rents which may be due to bank dispatched directors, a high percentage of client firm
share held by banks, or a strong use of keiretsu loans, do not enhance employee welfare
at banks client firms. To double check for any result that might support Nakatanis
(1984) argument, we furthermore run a regression specification that includes a dummy
for keiretsu affiliation called KEIRETSU. Column (2) of table 4-1 presents the
estimation result. The coefficient of the keiretsu dummy shows a negative sign without
being significant at any acceptable level. Thus, we cannot corroborate the findings of
Nakatani (1984).
Concerning main bank relationships, neither profit maximization nor growth
maximization was shown to be an appropriate motive for a main bank affiliation.
However, the positive and highly significant coefficient of the main bank dummy
suggests that, controlling for other factors, employees of firms with a main bank are
better compensated than those of firms without a main bank affiliation. The results
suggest that rather than increasing profitability or growth, gains from main bank
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affiliations may be used to improve employee welfare. We do not have a
straightforward explanation for this result. However, one of the reasons why only main
bank affiliations seem to have a positive influence on the level of employee
compensation may be their special position concerning the management of employee-
related services. In order to maintain this lucrative position, the main bank may use its
influence on the behavior of the firm to provide employee compensation. Recalling
furthermore the benefits that accrue to a bank once it has become a firms main bank
(see Miarka 2000), a bank-firm relationship based on a main bank affiliation truly
mutually benefits firm employees and the main bank.
5. Firm Risk
5.1 Introduction
Despite advantages of access to capital, bank-affiliated firms apparently do not
have any significant advantage over their peers when it comes to growth rates (chapter
5.3). Trying to explain these circumstances, Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) suggest that in
comparison with independent firms, banks may induce their client firms to be more risk
averse when deciding about investment projects. Their finding is close in line with
Miarka and Yang (1997), who show that in comparison to their peers, large Japanese
manufacturing firms with a strong dependency on bank loans decide on more risk-
averse investment projects. Furthermore, Montalvo and Yafeh (1994) claim that, having
a voice in the firms affairs, a main bank influences its client to decide on risk-averse
ways to access new technologies. In their study they show that rather than acquiring
knowledge of new technologies by developing them in-house, which would make risky
investment in R&D more likely, main bank clients are more inclined to gain access to
new technologies via licensing of relatively safe, proven foreign technologies.
Corroborating this finding, Yafeh and Yosha (1999) show that bank-affiliated firms
tend to spend less on R&D than unaffiliated firms. These observations, which all
demonstrate that bank affiliations reduce firm risk, are also close in spirit with our
findings discussed in Miarka 1999. We showed that close bank-firm relationships based
on bank-dispatched directors (DISPATCH), as well as relationships based on a large
percentage of client firm shares held by banks (SHARE) lead to increased monitoring,
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which decreases the private benefits of risky behavior. Hence, when analyzing the
impact of bank-firm relationships on firm risk, we expect bank affiliation to reduce firm
risk.
5.2 Empirical Analysis
Table 5-1 presents the estimation results of the determinants of firm risk. For the
measure of firm risk, we continue to use the variance of the return on sales over five
years at a time (see chapter 2)11. MV is the firms market value compared to its total
liabilities. It is positively correlated with firm risk, which is consistent with basic
investment theory: investments with higher risk should only be made if the risk is
compensated by a higher expected rate of return. Furthermore, firm risk is negatively
correlated with profitability, which we have measured once again as ordinary income
over sales. This is consistent with our earlier finding showing that profitability is
negatively correlated with firm risk (see chapter 2, Table 2-1). Note that in order to
control for factors that may affect accounting measures of our risk variable, the
regression specification furthermore includes the measurements debt over sales and log
(sales). Moreover, we include a measure that controls for the general development of
the Japanese economy during the boom-bust cycle: the coefficient of the annual growth
rate of Japans gross domestic product in real terms shows a negative sign and is
significant at the one per cent level. Thus, as expected, risk increases with decreasing
GDP growth.
More importantly, let us turn to the results of the bank-firm relationship variables.
Similar to regression specifications that have been carried out in initial modeling
attempts concerning bank-firm relationships and bank debt (Miarka 1999), the
coefficient of the main bank dummy as well as the coefficient of the variable
representing the dependency on bank loans originating from the affiliated kinyû keiretsu
(KEILO) are not significant at any acceptable level.
However, the coefficients in which we are most interested are those of the variables
DISPATCH and SHARE, as well as of the ratio of bank debt to total debt. The variables
                                                
11 Note, however, that further modeling attempts showed similar results when using the variance of the
return on capital.
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accounting for bank debt and the variables SHARE and DISPATCH are significant at
the one, five, and ten per cent level, respectively. Observing the direction of the three
variables, as expected, the coefficients of the two bank-firm relationship variables have
a negative sign while the coefficient for bank debt is positive. Concerning the results for
the bank-firm relationship variables, it allows us to assert that, controlling for other
factors, close bank-firm relationships established by bank dispatched directors
(DISPATCH) or based on a large percentage of client firm shares held by banks
(SHARE), reduce firm risk. Given our model (Miarka 1999), the result of the bank debt
ratio is not surprising either: In the model, we explained that firms have to overcome
moral hazard problems in order to have easy access to (cheaper) capital market finance.
A firm with a high need for finance compared to its market value may overcome the
moral hazard problem by inciting banks to monitor its actions. By doing so, the firm
may convince the dispersed investors in a competitive market that it behaves diligently.
However, since monitoring is costly for the bank, the firm needs to ask for a sufficiently
high amount of bank loans (which are costly for the firm) in order to be monitored
adequately. We furthermore showed in previous work (Miarka 1999, 2000) that many
bank-firm relationships have mainly historical origins and are therefore exogenous,
reducing monitoring costs and therefore the amount of bank loans that are needed to
incite the bank to monitor sufficiently. Nevertheless, as risk moral hazard is more
difficult and therefore more costly to monitor in risky firms, everything else being
equal, they have to take on a higher amount of bank loans than their peers. Hence, firm
risk has to be correlated positively to the number of loans originating from banks.
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Table 5-1: Firm risk, 1985-1998
Dependent variable: variance of the return on sales over five years at a time;
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1)
Relationship KEILO -0.00001
Variables  (-0.054)
DISPATCH -0.00210*
 (-1.774)
SHARE -0.00270**
 (-2.442)
MB 0.003550
   (0.222)
Sig. relationship variables 0.0000
Control Bank debt/total debt 0.00497***
Variables  (2.653)
MV 0.00114***
 (3.307)
Ordinary income/sales -0.09604***
 (-6.707)
Debt/sales 0.02390***
 (9.346)
Log(sales) -0.01601***
 (-6.336)
GDP -0.00139***
 (-4.866)
Year dummies Yes
Statistics Number of observations 1288
Number of groups     92
Obs. per group     14
Sign. F 0.0000
2R 0.3138
DW 1.9452
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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5.3 Conclusion
Summing up, the findings of our analysis on bank-firm relationship, bank debt and
firm risk fully support the results of our previous study on bank-firm relationships and
bank debt, discussed in Miarka (1999). Furthermore, the results confirm the findings
mentioned above, which all underline that bank affiliations may reduce firm risk.
However, though being generally similar in spirit to Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), we
are not able to corroborate their conclusion that a main bank affiliation is the particular
form of bank relationship which induces the firm to decide for more risk-averse
strategies. Our findings suggest rather that bank-firm relationships based on dispatched
directors and a high percentage of bank-held shares are most effective at reducing risk.
6. Interest Rates on Borrowings: Cost and Stability
We now turn to the issue of the costs of borrowing as well as the stability of these
costs for bank-affiliated firms versus independent firms. We continue to focus on large
firms in times of increasingly liberalized and deregulated financial markets.
6.1 The Cost of Bank Loans
6.1.1 Theories and Previous Empirical Results
For large, reputable firms like those in our sample, the relative cost of bank
borrowing is likely to be higher than the cost of borrowing from capital markets (see
Diamond 1991; Rajan 1992). Since the bank monitors the firm and controls its
investment decisions, it is in the position to alter the division of surplus between itself
and the firm. Similar to Rajans (1992) analysis on the consequences of ex post rent
extraction, Sharpe (1990) also assumes that banks can extract rents from their closely
affiliated client firms, because they have better information about the borrowers credit
risk. However, Tröge (1999) shows that this effect may disappear if outsiders can
observe the interest rates offered by the insider. He argues that the advantage of inside
banks results from their ability to provide better corporate governance rather than their
better knowledge of the client firms quality.
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No matter what the reasons for the advantage of inside banks and thus their ability
to extract rents, we can generally agree with Rajan (1992) that especially for large,
reputable firms, there is a fundamental trade-off between bank finance and arms-length
finance. With increasing choices between various sources of finance, this trade-off
becomes more and more apparent. Examining the impact of competition on the cost of
capital, in an extension of Diamond (1989), Petersen and Rajan (1995) suggest that in
contrast to small firms, where a banks competition comes mainly from other banks, the
main source of competition for banks to fulfill the financing requirements of larger
firms comes from arms-length sources like bond markets. When competition is from
arms-length markets rather than from other banks, it seems even more difficult for
banks to retain the business of successful firms. Hence, theory suggests that for banks,
one possible consequence of the further liberalization of arms-length credit markets is
to have to lower the costs of bank borrowings in order to stay competitive.
Surveying the literature on empirical analyses of Japanese bank-firm relationships,
it is widely claimed that banks are able to extract significant rents from their closely
affiliated client firms (see e.g. Weinstein and Yafeh 1998).
However, analyses of Japanese bank-firm relationships also strongly underscore
the benefits a firm may gain in return for higher interest rates. Credit from relationship
banks goes along with a wide range of advantages that cannot be obtained from other
sources of credit, e.g. arms-length sources. As we have already pointed out in chapter
4, a sufficient fraction of bank debt can incite the bank to monitor the firm
appropriately, which decreases the entrepreneurs incentives for risky behavior and
therefore increases the firms access to additional sources of finance. Furthermore,
having stable bank affiliations, many firms have been more or less able to count on their
banks willingness to lend to them. Especially in the case of routine investment, a
substantial number of large Japanese firms simply inform their banks of the investment
plans after company managers have already decided them. Also, it is claimed that in
times of financial distress, bank-affiliated firms can generally count on the main bank as
a lender of last resort and a source of competent managerial guidance. According to
most empirical analyses (e.g. Aoki and Patrick 1994), this system of  give and take
has been relatively stable throughout the post-war period. However, we must note that
most of the empirical analyses that support this view examine the advantages and costs
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of bank-firm relationships in a period where Japanese financial markets were highly
regulated and immature. At that time, the financial system largely favored already-
existing banks, and competition from alternative sources of outside finance was limited.
With increasing financial liberalization on the one hand, and the position of banks
as the major source of outside finance deteriorating since the 1980s on the other, easy
access to financial sources seems to be an issue of declining importance, especially for
highly valued firms. As mentioned above, the research results reported by Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998) support the hypothesis that banks can extract higher rents from their
affiliated firms. However, splitting up their observation period, they find evidence that
the premium extracted by banks in return for improved access to capital declined during
the later years of their inquiry, during which effects of the financial market
liberalization and deregulation gathered momentum. Their results suggest that the
premium banks could once easily extract from their dependent client firms via interest
rates has been under pressure since their position as the only major source of outside
finance began deteriorating.
Following Rajan (1992), a possible explanation for this development could be as
follows: Suppose that a firm has to finance an investment project with external sources
in order to obtain a stochastic payoff. In the case of a positive net present value, during
the pre-deregulation period when the firms source of finance was basically limited to
bank debt, the firm may have shared a substantial portion of the surplus from the project
with the banks in order to persuade them to continue lending. However, with the firms
freedom to diversify its sources of finance since the 1980s, the banks ability to
influence the division of surplus seems to have declined. As has been already pointed
out in Miarka 1999, especially highly valued firms are usually able to easily obtain
credit from sources other than banks. This leads to a diversification of financial sources,
and thus to a decreasing capacity for the banks to extract high interest rates. In fact,
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998), providing empirical evidence suggesting that banks seem
to charge profitable clients less than unprofitable ones, are much in line with Rajan
(1992), who argues that banks ability to control and to influence the division of surplus
are linked. In addition, evidence provided by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990)
shows that in the wake of increasing competition with arms-length credit markets,
firms with relatively high growth and high Tobins q reduce their bank ties and borrow
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from capital markets.
6.1.2 Empirical Analysis
In our empirical analysis we examine to what extent bank affiliations (still) had an
impact on the cost of bank loans during the boom-bust period between 1985-1998. We
then proceed in 6.2 by analyzing the influence of differing types bank-firm relationships
on the stability of interest rates over the same period12.
When analyzing the cost of bank loans from the firms point of view, ideally the
actual interest rates on bank loans should be examined. Unfortunately, such data are not
available. Instead, we follow Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) and use the average interest
rate on nonbond liabilities, that is, interest payments and discount expenses divided by
nonbond current and fixed liabilities. Though this measure includes some components
in the denominator that do not bear interest, it is virtually impossible to correct for this
due to the sometimes insufficient division of balance sheet positions. However, unlike
the Weinstein and Yafeh study where the interest rate itself is taken as the dependent
variable, we follow Berger and Udell (1995) in that we furthermore correct for
underlying prime rates by considering the difference between the yearly average of a
firms interest rate and the average prime rate per year13. For our regression, we once
again use a two-sided fixed effects model. In the model, the cost of borrowing is a
function of variables describing different kinds of bank-firm relationships and control
variables, including variables that account for firm characteristics.
Based on various theoretical rationales, our general expectations regarding the
signs of the fixed effect coefficients are as follows: First, firms will have to pay higher
interest rates as leverage increases. The same ought to be true for a high dependency on
                                                
12 Note that in contrast to Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) or Berger and Udell (1995), we do not use
the duration of a bank-borrower relationship as a measure of its strength, but rather continue to utilize
the same measures of bank-firm relationships as have been already used above. In their analysis,
Berger and Udell (1995) impose a maximum limit of 30 years on the variables that account for the age
of the firm as well as the continuous duration of a relationship. They claim that no additional relevant
information is revealed after 30 years. Taking into account that the youngest firm in our sample  was
founded in 1970 and most Japanese relationships between large manufacturing firms and banks, if
any, were established in the 1950s (many even in the pre-World War Two period), duration would not
be an appropriate measure for analyzing large, reputable Japanese firms.
13 Prime rates change dramatically over the observation period, peaking in 1985 with 5 per cent and
reaching a low of 0,5 per cent in September 1995, which stayed stable until the end of the observation
period (Economic and Financial Data on CD-ROM, Bank of Japan 1999).
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bank-loans. The firm-risk variable ought to carry positive coefficients since lenders are
likely to increase demand in the face of a high-risk firm. We suspect that more
successful firms with greater bargaining power will be relatively more successful than
less prosperous firms in avoiding high interest rates. It is equally plausible to us that this
is also true for larger firms when compared to smaller firms.
As to the relationship variables, it is more difficult to hypothesize since the
Japanese market has been changing a great deal in recent years. Theory (e.g. Diamond
1984, 1991) as well as recent empirical evidence (e.g. Weinstein and Yafeh 1998)
underline that relationships lower the lenders cost of lending to client firms. However,
it is far from clear to what degree, if at all, the lender is willing to pass along these
positive effects to the borrower in the form of lower loan interest rates. As mentioned
above, Petersen and Rajan (1994) note that whether the banks are forced to pass on the
generated cost savings depends much upon the competitiveness of the capital market.
The Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) study tentatively suggests a decreasing trend in the
interest rate bank-affiliated firms had to pay in the first half of the 1980s. If this
development is a result of deregulation and increasing competition between arms-
length and bank finance, we believe that this trend will have progressed much further
during our observation period. However, though competition might further reduce the
interest rates for bank borrowing, we do not necessarily expect that banks will pass on
the savings. Supposing that the information generated by bank-firm relationships is (at
least to some extent) private to the banks and not completely transferable by the
borrower to others, relationship banks may reduce the interest rate by less than the true
decline in cost (Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia 1989; Sharpe 1990; Rajan 1992;
Petersen and Rajan 1994).
The results from our fixed effects specifications are summarized in table 6-1.
Similar to Harhoff and Körting (1998b), we introduce the exogenous variables in groups
in order to observe how the correlation between some of them affects the results. Before
turning to the role of relationships, it is important not only to take account of the
underlying prime rate, but also to control for firm-specific characteristics that may
influence the interest rate. Hence, we start with a model that only includes firm-specific
characteristics and control variables.
 Looking at the regression results presented in column (1), we find the following:
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As expected, interest rates are an increasing function of the leverage ratio. The
coefficient of the variable indicating the dependency on bank loans as the major source
of finance is also significant at the one per cent level and shows a positive sign. Hence,
our result gives some evidence that banks can extract higher interest rates, especially
from firms that continue, despite financial liberalization, to be strongly dependent on
bank finance rather than diversify their financial sources. The variable indicating firm
risk is also positive, thus somewhat indicating that with increasing firm risk, the lender
tends to ask for a higher interest rate. Larger firms seem to pay lower interest rates,
possibly because they are perceived to be less risky. Note, however, that both the
variable accounting for firm risk and the one representing size are not significant at an
acceptable level. One can see that fast growing firms (in terms of sales growth as well
as employment growth) seem to face lower interest rates than those with high returns on
sales. Though showing a negative sign as expected, to our surprise the coefficient of the
variable for the firms market value over total debt is not significant at an acceptable
level. Furthermore, we find that the coefficient estimates we obtain for the variable
indicating the propensity to investment as well as for the variable accounting for the
firms ability to pay back its debt (profit/interest), are both negative and significant at
the one per cent level. This suggests that fast growing firms which are willing to expend
their investment, as well as firms which have no problem meeting their debt obligations,
certainly have some bargaining power when it comes to interest rates on bank loans. We
suppose that these firms are quite capable of using a large variety of financial sources
other than bank debt. As a result, they have to pay lower interest rates on their liabilities
than their peers.
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Table 6-1: Interest rates on borrowings, 1985-1998
Dependent variable: average interest rate on borrowings
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1) (2)
Relationship KEILO -0.01448**
Variables (-1.919)
DISPATCH 0.01209**
(2.030)
SHARE -0.00660
(-1.107)
MB -0.22267***
(-2.619)
Sig. relationship variables 0.000
Control Bank debt/total debt 0.57583*** 0.63586***
Variables (5.869) (6.396)
MV -0.01002 -0.01234
(-0.596) (-0.737)
ordinary income/sales 1.04044** 1.09933**
(1.737) (1.836)
Leverage 0.15900*** 0.15188***
(5.618) (5.352)
Sales growth -0.68135*** -0.67139***
(-3.693) (-3.653)
Propensity to invest -0.39703*** -0.39104***
(-5.017) (-4.958)
Profit/interest -0.01308*** -0.01301***
(-6.923) (-6.901)
employment growth -0.37859 -0.46271
(-1.085) (-1.325)
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
31
Table 6-1: Interest rates on borrowings, 1985-1998 (continued)
(1) (2)
Control Firm risk 2.08686 1.99229
Variables (1.345) (1.285)
Size -0.09056 -0.09394
(-1.471) (-1.529)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Statistics N of observations 1288 1288
N of groups     92    92
Obs. per group     14    14
Sign. F 0.000 0.000
2R 0.8597 0.8614
DW 1.9572 1.9738
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
For the purpose of our analysis, however, the most important coefficients are those
relating to bank affiliations. In column (2) we include the relationship variables among
the regressors14. Comparing column (1) and (2), the exclusion of the relationship
variables has virtually no effect on the coefficients in column (1). As for the variables
indicating bank-firm relationships, the measure of joint significance already suggests
that bank-firm relationships play a significant role in the pricing of loans. Asking for
bank loans from banks of the firms own keiretsu (KEILO) seems to enable the firm to
access lower interest rates. As has been already mentioned above, Weinstein and Yafeh
(1998) showed that interest rates for firms with a main bank affiliation decrease while
liberalization and deregulation are gaining ground. Controlling for other factors, the
coefficient of the main bank dummy in our specification underlines that this trend seems
to have progressed substantially after the mid-1980s. In fact, given a coefficient that is
negative and significant at the one per cent level, a main bank affiliation can be assumed
to lower interest rates during the second half of the 1980s and most of the 1990s.
                                                
14 As in previous analyses, we also tested for possible nonlinear relations: however, in none of the
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Although statistical significance is not high, the coefficient for the variable accounting
for the percentage of shares held by banks carries a negative sign as well.
However, the coefficient on the influence of dispatched bank representatives is
significant and positive. One of the reasons for this result might be that sending a highly
capable bank representative to the firm is exceptionally costly for the bank. Recall that
bankers who take a high position in the firms board of directors are especially often
dispatched in order to carry out consulting and management assignments in order to
improve the firms position. It is also generally agreed that having a bank representative
in a high-ranking position on the board increases credibility. Apparently, despite
increasing competition from arms-length finance, banks are still able to ask for the
compensation of such services (which arms-length finance cannot offer) via interest
rates. In fact, our result corroborates reported evidence (Bank of Japan 1992) that firms
which have chosen to maintain close bank-affiliations via dispatched directors can keep
the banks liquidity services and bankruptcy insurance scheme in exchange for a
liquidity and bankruptcy insurance premium.
6.2 Interest Rate Fluctuations
6.2.1 Theories and Previous Empirical Results
Besides easing access to capital, Japanese bank-firm relationships are alleged to
protect closely affiliated firms from various fluctuations in the cost of capital that would
make investment decisions difficult. In a series of articles, Hoshi, Kashyap and
Scharfstein (1990a, 1990b, 1991) show that Japanese firms closely affiliated with a
main bank are less vulnerable to fluctuations in cash flow and have lower costs of
financial distress than independent firms. Following the implicit long-term contract
theory, under the assumption that the bank is risk neutral and the firm is risk-averse, it is
to the benefit of both parties to fix the rate of interest over time (Teranishi, Goto and
Serizawa 1975). In fact, for his 1971-1982 sample, Nakatani (1984) shows that for
keiretsu firms which are affiliated with at least one keiretsu bank, the lending rate is
more stable over time, thus providing evidence that supports the hypothesis of the
implicit long-term contract theory.
                                                                                                                                              
analyses could nonlinear relations be found.
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Nevertheless, since liberalization in the 1980s and especially with the burst of the
speculative bubble in the early 1990s, risks as well as competition among the various
sources of debt have become larger and banks weaker. As banks may have been
disciplined by this process to offer particularly better-performing customers tailor-made,
competitive interest rates in order to be more competitive against other sources of
finance, it is not clear anymore whether they can continue to keep the interest rates for
their closely affiliated customers stable over time. In fact, anecdotal evidence suggests
that banks increasingly have to make use of the Material Adverse Change clause15
most credit contracts contain, thus often changing (increasing) interest rates and
sometimes calling back credit16. This raises some doubt as to whether in a time of
increasing competition and an overall weakened banking sector, banks are still able to
provide the insurance scheme against the fluctuation of interest rates to the same extent
as has been observed in earlier years. Also note that other insurance schemes like
averting bankruptcy seem to erode as well (Financial Times 28.10.1998: 16). While the
benefits of bank debt seem to decrease, a rising number of firms may prefer credit from
arms-length sources, which neither provides the benefits of bank debt nor incurs the
costs.
Clearly, if creditors rely on interest rates as their only or at least primary source of
revenues, and given that the creditors have to compete in a highly deregulated market, it
seems hard to smoothen interest rates since abilities to spread interests over time or to
compensate for lower-than-competitive interest rates with other revenues are few. The
analysis by Petersen and Rajan (1995) already suggests that in a competitive
environment, despite long-term relationships, it is difficult for creditors to charge a
lower-than-competitive interest rate at any point in time over the life cycle of the firm.
They emphasize that competition may continuously prevent the creditor from charging a
higher-than-competitive rate that could compensate/anticipate the loss that will be or
has been incurred by offering a lower-than-competitive interest rate. In other words,
with increasing competition, the ability of the creditor to obtain surplus from a firm
                                                
15 Whereas the interest rate and the duration of a bond are fixed once for all, most credit contracts
contain an unspecific Material Adverse Change clause (MAC) which gives the bank the discretion
to call back the credit or increase the interest rate whenever this seems appropriate (Petersen and
Rajan 1995; Tröge 1999). Though banks had been reluctant to invoke this clause in earlier years, the
extreme conditions especially after the burst of the bubble forced the banks to invoke it more often
(KPMG Peat Marwick 1993).
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during one period, which could be used to offset losses obtained during another period
is weakened. Consequently, it is difficult to accept lower returns up front.
6.2.1.1 Empirical Analysis
In order to observe the stability of interest rates, as our dependent variable we once
again take the difference between the average interest rate and the prime rate and then
compute its variance over five years at a time for every sample firm
and year between 1985-199817. The variance is computed similar to the way we
computed the variance of the return on sales. Hence, unlike Nakatani (1984), and
Wakita (1983), we focus on the variance of the interest on nonbond liabilities rather
than on all interest bearing liabilities, and we correct for underlying prime rates.
Table 6-2 presents estimation results of what determines our dependent variable.
Explanatory variables include the same measures for variables describing different ways
of bank-firm relationships and control variables, as had been used for our estimation on
interest rates. Results of the control variables are as expected: The coefficients of
variables like the firms market value or the ratio of ordinary income over sales are all
negative and significant. Hence, the variance of the difference between the interest rate
and the prime rate is a decreasing function of measures that account for the quality of
the firm. With increasing dependence on bank loans, the dependent variable also
increases.
For the purpose of this chapter, however, the coefficients of our bank-firm
relationship variables are more important: The dominant determinant of the variance of
interest rates appears to be whether or not a firm maintains a main bank affiliation with
a coefficient of -0.23 (standard error 0.038; significant at the one per cent level).
Apparently, the lending rate of interest is more stable for firms affiliated with a main
bank. This result is very much in line with Nakatani (1984: 242), who could show that
the lending rate of interest is made more stable over time for the firm involved in a
keiretsu relationship with a bank.
                                                                                                                                              
16 Interview with an anonymous director of Daiwa Shôken, London, 23.07.1997.
17 Note that, of course, for constructing the variance of the difference between the interest rate and the
prime rate over five years at a time between 1985-1998, in a first step we had to construct the
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Table 6-2: Stability of the interest rate, 1985-1998
Dependent variable: variance of difference between interest rate and prime rate
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1)
Relationship KEILO 0.00210
Variables  (0.627)
DISPATCH 0.00879***
 (3.334)
SHARE 0.00684***
 (2.589)
MB -0.22900***
 (-6.081)
Sig. relationship variables 0.000
Control Bank debt/ total debt 0.14332***
Variables  (3.254)
MV -0.02582***
 (-3.481)
ordinary income/sales -0.46469**
 (-1.752)
Leverage -0.04965***
 (-3.950)
Sales growth -0.10003
 (-1.229)
Propensity to invest -0.08163**
 (-2.337)
Profit/interest -0.00002
 (-0.020)
employment growth 0.19605
 (1.267)
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
                                                                                                                                              
difference between the interest rate and the prime rate for the period between 1981-1998.
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Table 6-2: Stability of the interest rate, 1985-1998 (continued)
Dependent variable: variance of difference between interest rate and prime rate
Fixed effects regression coefficients (T-values)
(1)
Control Firm risk -0.54778
Variables  (-0.798)
Size 0.10455***
 (3.842)
Year dummies Yes
Statistics N of observations 1288
N of groups  92
Obs. per group    14
Sign. F 0.000
2R 0.7364
DW 1.9798
Note: *, **, ***: Significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
However, combining this with our previous findings on the effect of a main bank
affiliation on interest rates, we find the result quite surprising. Seemingly, main banks
are able to reduce the risk of interest rate fluctuations for their clients without asking for
higher interest rates from them. Our interpretation is that being the firms main bank
seems to be so valuable for the bank that it keeps on providing services, like protecting
the client firm from the risk of strongly fluctuating interest rates, in order not to loose its
overall highly profitable position. It seems plausible to us that in times where lending
rates diminish in profitability, the main bank position, which includes attending to the
firms employee accounts as well as lucrative fee-based and commission banking, is of
exceptional importance for banks (Scher 1997). Putting it differently, in contrast to
other banks, the main bank manages much better to extract compensation for its services
from privileges that are not directly related to the provision of loans. In contrast to the
provision of capital, where competition increased dramatically, main banks have
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obviously been able to defend other areas of banking where long term trust, inside
information and firm-specific competence are more difficult to obtain. The rents which
main banks can extract from these services seem to be high enough to allow for
continued smoothening of interest rates, despite increasing competition in the credit
market.  Hence, in contrast to positions of other banks, a main bank position that insures
access to lucrative services other than the provision of loans makes it much easier to
spread the costs that might occur e.g. in the smoothening interest rates, over multiple
products.
In fact, the coefficients of the other three relationship variables seem to further
support this view: all of them describe different forms of bank-firm relationships which
do not necessarily go along with the lucrative services a main bank is most likely
allowed to offer. Therefore, these types of bank affiliation do not seem to have the
ability to provide the same insurance scheme a main bank manages to offer. Hence, it is
no surprise that none of the coefficients of the remaining three bank-firm relationship
variables carry a positive sign. To be more precise, the results suggest that the types of
bank-firm relationships represented by the variables KEILO and SHARE would neither
allow the banks to fully remunerate potential losses through lucrative services as
discussed above, nor would banks involved in these types of affiliations necessarily
manage to compensate losses by extracting higher-than-competitive interest rates. As to
the type of bank-firm relationship represented by DISPATCH, the results show that
banks which have dispatched representatives to the boards use the revenue from higher-
than-competitive interest rates in order to compensate the cost of dispatching, rather
than to protect clients from interest rate fluctuations. To summarize, our findings are
similar in spirit to Petersen and Rajan (1995): creditors in competitive markets, which
are not compensated for their services and not able to spread possible costs that might
be caused by the smoothening of interest rates over multiple products, have no
assurance anymore of obtaining future surplus from the firm via interest rates. Thus
they are unable to secure their clients against the risk of interest rate volatility.
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6.2.2 Conclusion
Our analysis highlights the impact of bank-firm relationships on the cost of
commercial bank loans and the stability of these costs after accounting for underlying
prime rates. Once again, the evidence indicates that it is necessary to distinguish
between the different forms of bank-firm relationships. Though relationships of all
forms have effects on commercial bank loan contracting, they certainly do not always
lead into the same direction. Bank affiliations formed by dispatched directors offer
advantages that seem to secure to some degree the monopoly power for the bank; thus
these banks can continue to extract higher-than-competitive interest rates on
borrowings. The remaining three kinds of bank-firm relationships we examined,
however, have submitted to competition. The analysis of the stability of interest rates
shows an equally heterogeneous picture. While main bank affiliations remain able to
protect the client firm from fluctuations of interest rates, the remaining three types of
bank-firm relationships seem unable to do so.
Comparing our results with previous findings, the analysis further supports the
view  that the degree of competition in credit markets is an important determinant of the
value and effect of bank-firm relationships. As has been already suggested by others
(e.g. Kobayashi et al. 1993), the liberalization process seems to make banking
relationships more businesslike and therefore more clearly driven by market factors like
profitability. Since risk is not significant when included in either of these regressions
and overall firm demand for liquidity is declining over the period observed, the
evidence most likely suggests a decline in bank monopoly while liberalization proceeds,
rather than a declining implicit bankruptcy insurance premium. While a relationship
reduces the lenders expected cost, the lender only shares this cost reduction with the
firm when competition encroaches upon the lenders informational monopoly. We have
shown that the position of banks remains unchanged in areas where banks, for one
reason or the other, are not confronted with competition or can cope with competition
due to advantages in other areas. Furthermore, our findings are consistent with the
financial intermediation literature cited above (e.g. Rajan 1992), which shows that, to
mitigate the problem of ex post rent extraction by informed lenders, the borrowing firm
will attempt to weaken the bargaining power of these lenders by giving higher priority
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to arms-length finance. Obviously, liberalization in Japan increases the firms capacity
to do so. The results suggest that with competition, banks increasingly have to share the
cost savings they may accrue from relationships with firms. Though it is obviously
increasing, note that we are not able to detect to what degree banks pass these cost
savings on to the client firm.
Liberalization may have many other advantages. However, credit market
competition is likely to impose constraints on the ability of the firm and creditor to
intertemporally share surplus. As the market power of banks decreases, they cannot
extract a larger share of the future surplus generated by the firm, as was possible in a
regulated and concentrated market. Thus, competition prohibits banks more and more
from generating an implicit equity stake in the firm that could enable it to set a lower
interest rate for entrepreneurial projects. This finding agrees with that of Mayer (1988)
and Rajan (1992), that increased competition in financial markets reduces the value of
relationships because it prevents a bank from reaping the rewards of helping the firm at
an early stage. It is therefore possible that banks are less and less able to prevent
projects with low short-term returns and/or high risk but long-term viability from being
prematurely discontinued. Note that this development is especially dangerous to an
economy whose financial markets do not sufficiently compensate for it by initiating
alternative structures like venture capital markets.
The findings are furthermore supported by much reported evidence that the
banking sectors ability to act as a lender of last resort is deteriorating. Clearly, with
only a few exceptions, the developments described above make lending relationships
less valuable to a firm since it is less likely to get help when most needed. Finally, it is
important to note that the already-weakened Japanese banking sector does not only have
to deal with increasing competition from the capital markets. To aggravate their
situation, banks have to cope with the unique phenomenon that since the burst of the
bubble, interest rates are strongly declining while demand is continuously weakening at
the same time. This development dramatically shifts the bargaining power in favor of
firms, allowing them to play out banks against alternative sources of finance and most
recently also against each other.
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6.3 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Our analysis highlights central aspects of the role of Japanese bank-firm
relationships in times of liberalization and deregulation. Comparing our results with
earlier findings, it becomes evident that financial liberalization and deregulation have
triggered dramatic changes concerning the position of banks in the financial market and
their relationships with large manufacturing firms.
Since liberalization and deregulation have opened up domestic as well as foreign
capital markets, easy access to capital is not limited to bank-affiliated firms. While in
earlier years firms with close banking ties may have been more profitable or used their
advantages to enhance their growth or the compensation of employees, now whether
such a relationship benefits a firm or acts as an obstacle depends largely upon the nature
of that relationship. Hence, there are two general points made in this chapter. First, in
order to assess the economic role of bank affiliations, it is of eminent importance to
differentiate between the various ways of establishing and maintaining bank-firm
relationships. Second, the rapid development of the Japanese financial market over the
last two decades has reduced the monopoly power of banks in a wide range of areas,
which has caused dramatic changes concerning the benefits and costs of bank-firm
relationships.
Using a variety of proxies which enable us to differentiate between different
aspects of bank-firm relationships, the analysis clearly shows that the effect of a bank
affiliation can differ substantially. Concerning the opportunity to enhance profitability
through advantages of bank affiliations, only when a bank affiliation allows a firm to
use large numbers of keiretsu loans may the firm be more profitable than its
competitors. If at all, bank-firm relationships seem to have a negative effect on the
promotion of growth. Moreover, only the advantages that accompany a main bank
affiliation seem to improve the compensation of employees. While bank-firm
relationships were widely assumed to decrease firm risk, our empirical results do not
find any evidence that this can be explained by a main bank affiliation or a strong
dependence on keiretsu loans. However, a strong influence from banks via bank
dispatched directors or large shareholdings seems to have a positive impact on firm risk.
Perhaps the most interesting finding of our study is the impact of credit market
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liberalization on the cost and stability of interest rates for bank-affiliated firms. Caves
and Uekusa (1976) already argued more than twenty years ago that the rationed
Japanese capital market, which protects established banks from competition, is the main
reason why Japanese banks were able to easily extract rents generated by bank-firm
relationships. They demonstrate that in times of limited competition, banks could obtain
these rents via high interest rates and via pressure on client firms to use bank loans as
the major source for capital inputs. Comparing our results with previous findings, it
seems plausible to argue that with increasing liberalization and decreasing demand for
finance, it becomes more and more difficult for banks to extract these rents from their
client firms. Only in cases where banks can combine the provision of capital with
additional services like managerial advice that cannot be offered by alternative financial
sources, may banks continue to charge higher-than-competitive interest rates. Overall,
however, competition seems to force banks to increasingly share the rents that may
originate from advantages of bank-firm relationships by charging competitive interest
rates. This development also affects the impact of bank affiliations on the stability of
interest rates: as the debt market becomes increasingly competitive, it seems to be more
and more difficult to spread the cost of reducing the volatility of interest rates by asking
lower-than-competitive interest rates during one period and higher-than-competitive
interest rate during another period. Only banks that can spread these costs over multiple
products may still be able to insure client firms against interest rate fluctuations.
Clearly, the interpretation of our empirical results is a far cry from the popular
views of the bank-dominated Japanese financial system as an engine of growth for
highly efficient firms. Taking a closer look at the system of Japanese bank-firm
relationships in transition reveals a more complicated scenario, which includes both
advantages and at the same time impediments. Obviously, when alternatives to bank
finance increase, the negative components of the system of bank-firm relationships
become more evident. The results largely accord with Mayer (1988) and Rajan (1992),
who show that increasing competition in financial markets reduces the value of bank-
firm relationships. Nevertheless, the results rule out the notion that relationships are of
no value, or that relationships and competition are incompatible. Bank financing often
involves a long-term relationship that still may help to attenuate problems of
asymmetric information that cannot be solved by arms-length finance. Also note that
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despite an increase in arms-length finance, necessary channels like markets for
corporate control, which are typical for engineering intervention in a financial system
where arms-length finance is well developed, have just started to evolve in Japan.
Especially until these forms of intervention are fully developed, the Japanese economy
will continue to rely heavily on control-oriented finance and therefore bank finance, to
ensure that firms behave diligently. In other words, the various forms of bank-firm
relationships do not necessarily lose their raison dêtre. Despite competition, bank-firm
relationships can still be valuable for both sides. However, the Japanese financial
system and with it, bank-firm relationships have entered a new phase of economic
development. Banks slowly begin to realize their fading advantages as well as new
opportunities. Hence we can conclude that bank affiliations will continue to be an
important factor for the international competitiveness of modern Japanese firms, though
not necessarily in the same way as was common during the pre-liberalization period. It
is therefore necessary to adjust the image of the banking system as it has existed in
much of the post-war era in Japan.
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APPENDIX
I Definition of Variables
Variable Explanation
capital/employees total capital to number of employees
capital stock capital stock and paid in new capital
stock (in billion Yen)
debt/equity *total debt to total equity
debt/sales total debt to sales
debt/total assets leverage
Note: * indicates that this variable has been truncated at the upper and lower percentile in order
to avoid outliers.
I Definition of Variables (continued)
Variable Explanation
DISPATCH index expressing degree of personal
relationship between banks and client
firms
employment growth employment growth of each year
(yearly difference of log(employees))
equity/total assets equity ratio
firm risk firm risk measured by variance of
return on sales over five years at
a time
GDP growth (in per cent) of gross domestic
product in real terms
Note: * indicates that this variable has been truncated at the upper and lower percentile in order
to avoid outliers.
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I Definition of Variables (continued)
Variable Explanation
interest interest rate on borrowings
interest on borrowing/sales ratio of interest on total borrowings to
total sales
interest ratio interest and discount expenses to
liabilities
investment/employees ratio of investment in plant and
equipment to number of employees
investment/sales revenue ratio of investment in plant and
equipment to sales revenue
KEILO measure indicating existence and
degree of kinyû keiretsu affiliation
under the aspect of loan-dependency
Note: * indicates that this variable has been truncated at the upper and lower percentile in order
to avoid outliers.
I Definition of Variables (continued)
Variable Explanation
KEIRETSU dummy variable indicating whether or
not a firm has a kinyû keiretsu
affiliation
ln(assets) natural logarithm of firm size measured
by total assets
ln(employees) natural logarithm of firm size measured
by number of employees
Note: * indicates that this variable has been truncated at the upper and lower percentile in order
to avoid outliers.
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I Definition of Variables (continued)
Variable Explanation
log sales logarithm of sales
long-term liabilities/ total assets ratio of long-term liabilities (maturities
longer than one year) to total assets
MB dummy variable indicating whether or
not a firm has a main-bank affiliation
MV market value of the firm to total
liabilities
net income total net income (in billion Yen)
net income/sales total net income to total sales
nonbond interest/ nonbond liabilities ratio of nonbond interest expenses to
nonbond liabilities
ordinary income/ sales ordinary income to sales
profit/interest *ratio of pre-tax profit (loss) to total
interest payments
profit/total assets pretax profits to total assets
Note: * indicates that this variable has been truncated at the upper and lower percentile in order
to avoid outliers.
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I Definition of Variables (continued)
Variable Explanation
propensity to invest ratio of investment in fixed assets
to fixed assets of previous year
RME ratio of male employees to total
employees adjusted with respect to age
structure of firms work force:
with ME: number of male employees;
AGM: average age of male employees;
FE: number of female employees;
AGF: average age of female employees
ROE *after-tax return on equity
ROI return on investment
ROS return on sales
sales growth annual growth rate of sales
SHARE ratio of client-firm-shares held by banks
among the 20 largest shareholders
short-term liabilities/total assets ratio of short-term liabilities (maturities
up to one year) to total assets
size variable ranging from 1 (smallest) to 4
(largest) defined by quartiles of total
assets
Note: * indicates that this variable has been truncated at the upper and lower percentile in order
to avoid outliers.
AGFFEAGMME
AGMME
RME
×+×
×
=
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I Definition of Variables (continued)
Variable Explanation
total labor cost/employees firms total labor cost (including salary,
other compensations, contributions to
fringe benefits and social security) to
the number of employees at the end of
each accounting period
var interest rate; prime rate variance of difference between interest
rate and prime rate over five years
increments
Note: * indicates that this variable has been truncated at the upper and lower percentile in order
to avoid outliers.
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II Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables
Variable N Mean 25 % 75%
Percentile     Percentile
capital/employees 1288 66.234 43.841 82.211
capital stock 1288 43.300 10.800 43.200
debt/equity 1288 2.006 0.854 2.553
debt/sales 1288 0.732 0.549 0.870
debt/total assets 1288 0.582 0.461 0.719
DISPATCH 1288 4.744 0.000 7.326
employment growth 1288 0.001  -0.022 0.026
equity/total assets 1288 0.418 0.281 0.539
firm risk 1288 0.021 0.009 0.024
GDP 1288 2.750 1.000 4.800
Source: KAISHA database; authors computation
II Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables (continued)
Variable N Mean 25 % 75%
Percentile Percentile
interest 1288 0.025 0.016 0.032
interest on borrowings/ 1288 0.019 0.010 0.024
sales
interest ratio 1288 0.016 0.006 0.023
investment/employees 1288 5326.641 2240.813 6800.329
Source: KAISHA database; authors computation
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II Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables (continued)
Variable N Mean 25 % 75%
Percentile Percentile
investment/sales revenue 1288   0.102   0.054   0.131
KEILO 1288   0.115   0.000   0.239
KEIRETSU 1288   0.402 --- ---
ln(assets) 1288 19.317 18.542 20.049
ln(employees) 1288   8.320   7.574   8.845
log sales 1288 19.106 18.510 19.819
long-term liabilities/ 1288   0.190   0.128   0.254
total assets
MB 1288   0.814 --- ---
MV 1288   3.340   1.988   3.807
net income 1288 10.100   1.600 10.800
net income/sales 1288   0.024   0.012   0.038
Source: KAISHA database; authors computation
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II Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables (continued)
Variable N Mean 25 % 75%
Percentile Percentile
nonbond interest/ 1271 0.020 0.009 0.029
nonbond liabilities
ordinary income/sales 1288 0.024 0.012 0.038
profit/interest 1288 7.041 1.001 6.967
profit/total assets 1288 0.043 0.018 0.067
propensity to invest 1288 0.418 0.229 0.540
RME 1288 0.884 0.848 0.929
ROE 1288 0.046 0.029 0.081
ROI 1288 0.035 0.025 0.049
ROS 1288 0.056 0.025 0.079
sales growth 1288 0.038 -0.020 0.092
SHARE 1288 0.218 0.162 0.268
short-term liabilities/ 1288 0.391 0.276 0.498
total assets
size 1288 2.498 --- ---
total labour cost/ 1288 6.396 5.585 7.387
employees
var interest rate; 1288 1.019 0.572 1.408
prime rate
Source: KAISHA database; authors computation
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